Sex, sex differences, and social behavior

Sex differences in social behavior are center stage in recent formulations of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology, with its emphasis on the long-term consequences of early adaptations, offers itself as an alternative meta-theory to mainstream social psychology, which emphasizes the importance of social structures in determining the existence and extent of social and cognitive sex differences. Using a range of examples, we argue that evolutionary psychology is open to criticism on several fronts: It does not (a) include a rule for mediating and moderating variables or test predictions rigorously; (b) appreciate the importance of the difference between first- and second-order effects; (c) offer a truly interactionist theory; or (d) seriously consider the social implications of sex-based inequities. We also argue that social psychology has, in its turn, failed to appreciate the nonintuitive richness of some evolutionary hypotheses or that there is a role for evolutionary psychology in a genuinely interactionist theory This paper restates the need for that perspective, and suggests how it may be achieved.