On the correctness of an approach against side-channel attacks

Peng Wang, Dengguo Feng, Wenling Wu, Liting Zhang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec'07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA λ IND → IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security Practice and Experience - 5th International Conference, ISPEC 2009, Proceedings
Pages336-344
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event5th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2009 - Xi'an, China
Duration: 13 Apr 200915 Apr 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5451 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference5th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2009
Country/TerritoryChina
CityXi'an
Period13/04/0915/04/09

Keywords

  • Provable security
  • Side-channel attack
  • Symmetric encryption

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