Abstract
The debate about psychiatric nosology was reignited last year when the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) was published to widespread criticism. Critics cite a number of problems with 'psychiatric diagnosis', though it is sometimes unclear which classificatory practices are included under this broad heading. Although it may be possible to avoid the problems inherent in the DSM system, other difficulties associated with classification (labelling, stigma) may prove harder to escape. The first part of this article argues that some form of psychiatric classification is made inevitable by the communicative, epistemic and ethical pressures on psychiatry. In the second half it is suggested that there are ways to think differently about our relationship to psychiatric classification, and that these could play a role in mitigating the harms outlined by diagnosis' critics.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 361-375 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Social Theory and Health |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 5 Nov 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- labelling
- mental health
- philosophy of mental illness
- psychiatric diagnosis
- stigma