TY - JOUR
T1 - Brucella exposure risk events in 10 clinical laboratories, New York City, USA, 2015 to 2017
AU - Ackelsberg, Joel
AU - Liddicoat, Anna
AU - Burke, Taryn
AU - Szymczak, Wendy A.
AU - Levi, Michael H.
AU - Ostrowsky, Belinda
AU - Hamula, Camille
AU - Patel, Gopi
AU - Kopetz, Virginia
AU - Saverimuttu, Jessie
AU - Sordillo, Emilia Mia
AU - D'Souza, David
AU - Mitchell, Elizabeth A.
AU - Lowe, William
AU - Khare, Reeti
AU - Tang, Yi Wei
AU - Bianchi, Anabella Lucca
AU - Egan, Christina
AU - Perry, Michael J.
AU - Hughes, Scott
AU - Rakeman, Jennifer L.
AU - Adams, Eleanor
AU - Kharod, Grishma A.
AU - Tiller, Rebekah
AU - Saile, Elke
AU - Lee, Stephen
AU - Gonzalez, Edimarlyn
AU - Hoppe, Brett
AU - Leviton, Ira M.
AU - Hacker, Susan
AU - Ni, Kuey Fen
AU - Orsini, Reina L.
AU - Jhaveri, Sangam
AU - Mazariegos, Irving
AU - Dingle, Tanis
AU - Koll, Brian
AU - Stoddard, Robyn A.
AU - Galloway, Renee
AU - Hoffmaster, Alex
AU - Fine, Annie
AU - Lee, Ellen
AU - Dentinger, Catherine
AU - Harrison, Emily
AU - Layton, Marcelle
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2020 American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - From 2015 to 2017, 11 confirmed brucellosis cases were reported in New York City, leading to 10 Brucella exposure risk events (Brucella events) in 7 clinical laboratories (CLs). Most patients had traveled to countries where brucellosis is endemic and presented with histories and findings consistent with brucellosis. CLs were not notified that specimens might yield a hazardous organism, as the clinicians did not consider brucellosis until they were notified that bacteremia with Brucella was suspected. In 3 Brucella events, the CLs did not suspect that slow-growing, small Gram-negative bacteria might be harmful. Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization- time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS), which has a limited capacity to identify biological threat agents (BTAs), was used during 4 Brucella events, which accounted for 84% of exposures. In 3 of these incidents, initial staining of liquid media showed Gram-positive rods or cocci, including some cocci in chains, suggesting streptococci. Over 200 occupational exposures occurred when the unknown isolates were manipulated and/or tested on open benches, including by procedures that could generate infectious aerosols. During 3 Brucella events, the CLs examined and/or manipulated isolates in a biological safety cabinet (BSC); in each CL, the CL had previously isolated Brucella. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations to prevent laboratory-acquired brucellosis (LAB) were followed; no seroconversions or LAB cases occurred. Laboratory assessments were conducted after the Brucella events to identify facility-specific risks and mitigations. With increasing MALDI-TOF MS use, CLs are well-advised to adhere strictly to safe work practices, such as handling and manipulating all slow-growing organisms in BSCs and not using MALDI-TOF MS for identification until BTAs have been ruled out.
AB - From 2015 to 2017, 11 confirmed brucellosis cases were reported in New York City, leading to 10 Brucella exposure risk events (Brucella events) in 7 clinical laboratories (CLs). Most patients had traveled to countries where brucellosis is endemic and presented with histories and findings consistent with brucellosis. CLs were not notified that specimens might yield a hazardous organism, as the clinicians did not consider brucellosis until they were notified that bacteremia with Brucella was suspected. In 3 Brucella events, the CLs did not suspect that slow-growing, small Gram-negative bacteria might be harmful. Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization- time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS), which has a limited capacity to identify biological threat agents (BTAs), was used during 4 Brucella events, which accounted for 84% of exposures. In 3 of these incidents, initial staining of liquid media showed Gram-positive rods or cocci, including some cocci in chains, suggesting streptococci. Over 200 occupational exposures occurred when the unknown isolates were manipulated and/or tested on open benches, including by procedures that could generate infectious aerosols. During 3 Brucella events, the CLs examined and/or manipulated isolates in a biological safety cabinet (BSC); in each CL, the CL had previously isolated Brucella. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations to prevent laboratory-acquired brucellosis (LAB) were followed; no seroconversions or LAB cases occurred. Laboratory assessments were conducted after the Brucella events to identify facility-specific risks and mitigations. With increasing MALDI-TOF MS use, CLs are well-advised to adhere strictly to safe work practices, such as handling and manipulating all slow-growing organisms in BSCs and not using MALDI-TOF MS for identification until BTAs have been ruled out.
KW - Biosafety
KW - Brucellosis
KW - Laboratory-acquired infection
KW - Risk assessment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85078687415&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1128/JCM.01096-19
DO - 10.1128/JCM.01096-19
M3 - Article
C2 - 31694974
AN - SCOPUS:85078687415
SN - 0095-1137
VL - 58
JO - Journal of Clinical Microbiology
JF - Journal of Clinical Microbiology
IS - 2
M1 - e01096-19
ER -